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thereby be decreased. Moreover, since the legislative roots of Article 18
lie deep in private agency and trust law, it would be in keeping with that
tradition for the legislature to declare contracts affected by conflicts of
interest to be voidable rather than void. Notwithstanding the foregoing
remarks, Article 18 appears to be a significant attempt to achieve uniform
regulation of conflict of interests.
Finally, it should be noted that the ultimate problem in this area is
that of trust, and it is difficult to disagree with the thoughts expressed by
Dean Manning: "The best way to make a man trustworthy is to trust
him. And the best way to attract men of dignity to public office is to
treat them as men of dignity." 76
BERNARD M. BRODSKY
GROUP LEGAL SERVICES AND THE NEW CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
The unique monopoly granted the legal profession to render legal
services imposes a duty on the professioni to ensure that every person who
is in need of such services has ready access to them at an affordable cost.'
While the profession has accepted the burden in regard to the indigent,2
it has become increasingly apparent that a large proportion of our popula-
tion, somewhere between the poles of poverty and affluence, has been un-
able to obtain these needed services.&3 This gap is attributable, at least in
part, to the potential recipients' lack of awareness of legal services; more
specifically, to the ignorance of the public as to the need and value of such
services, the lack of knowledge as to where to find a lawyer and of any
particular attorney's qualifications, and finally, fear of the law itself,
especially its processes and delays. 4 From the standpoint of the profession,
76. Manning, The Purity Potlatch, 24 FED. B.J. 239, 254 (f964).
1. "The maxim 'privilege brings responsibility' can be expanded to read, 'exclusive
privilege to render public service brings responsibility to assure that the service is
available to those in need of it.'" Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsi-
bility of the Individual Lawyer and the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438, 443
(1965).
2. This comment will be restricted to a discussion of the legal problems of the
non-indigent, as to treat the problems of the poor would necessitate a detailed examina-
tion of current facilities designed to supply their needs. In addition, the problems of
the indigent vary significantly from those of the non-indigent.
3. "The need for some device for making lawyers' services more readily available
to the public is apparent from the fact that laxge numbers of persons of moderate means
do not now obtain needed legal services- at least not from lawyers." Christensen, Lawyer
Referral Services: An Alternative to Lay Group Legal Services?, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 341,
342 (1965).
4. Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes, 63
CoLuM. L. REv. 973, 975 (1963).
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the gap has largely been created by the restrictions imposed upon lawyers
in rendering services, especially "the standards . . . that condemn adver-
tising by lawyers, the representation of conflicting interests, and lay inter-
mediaries that impair the direct loyalty of the lawyer to his clients."5 In-
addition, the security of the profession under such standards has led to
"inertia of the bar coupled with fear of change."0 The result has been in-
equality of legal representation, causing laymen to turn to non-lawyers for
solution of their legal problems. Primarily, the recipients' efforts have been
in arrangements now known popularly as group legal services, whereby
members of the group are provided with legal assistance by the organization
for their own individual needs.7 Such arrangements have stirred the ire of
the organized Bar, but in light of recent Supreme Court decisions recogniz-
ing the constitutionality of such arrangements, the Bar has been required
to re-evaluate its position. The product of this re-evaluation is the new
Code of Professional Responsibilitys which has supplanted the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Before turning to the Code, however, the judicial pro-
ceedings which preceded its adoption must first be reviewed.
I. GROUP LEGAL SERVICES AND THE SUPREME COURT
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court decided NAACP v. Button.0
Since 1849, Virginia had outlawed "running" or "capping," and in 1959,
the State attempted to regulate the NAACP's activities by including in the
definition of a "runner" or "capper," "an agent for an individual or organi-
zation which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is
not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability."' 0 As a re-
sult, certain activities of the NAACP fell within this expanded definition,
and thus constituted the unauthorized practice of law. These activities in-
cluded the NAACP's maintenance of a legal staff of fifteen lawyers, paid by
the organization on a per diem basis to conduct litigation on racial issues.
Whether or not an action was to be approved was determined by the
NAACP Chairman with the concurrence of the President. Primarily con-
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. When speaking of group legal services, a distinction must be kept in mind.
Organizations which provide such services for their members obviously engage attorneys,
as will be discussed below. However, non-lawyer members of the group may provide
limited services of a legalistic nature to the individuals, for example, bringing the
attorney and client together. These latter individuals thus perform "non-lawyer" serv-
ices.
8. Hereinafter referred to as the Code.
9. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
10. Id. at 423. Chapter 33, Virginia Acts of Assembly 1956, provided the expanded
definition. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, 54-78, & 54-79 (1950), as amended, Acts of 1956, Ex.
Sess., ch. 33 (Repl. Vol. 1958).
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cerned with school desegregation cases, the NAACP would send one of its
lawyers to advise potential litigants of the coming struggle, with forms for
their signature authorizing the staff lawyers to act for them in the litigation.
The litigation itself was in the control of the attorneys, with litigants free
to withdraw at any time.
The NAACP brought an action to have the provision of the Virginia
statute declared inapplicable to its activities, or, if applicable, as null and
void on the grounds that it violated their first and fourteenth amendment
rights to speech, petition and assembly. The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals" held that the NAACP's activities fell within the expanded defini-
tion of Chapter 53, and also violated Canons 35 and 47 of the ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics. ' On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the highest state court's ruling, holding, "The activities of the
NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of
expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the
legal profession, as improper solicitation of legal business violative of
Chapter 33 and the Canons of Profesional Ethics."1 3
The Court, asserting that "a state cannot foreclose the exercise of con-
stitutional rights by mere labels,' 4 went on to say: "abstract discussion is
not the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the
First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends,
against government intrusion."' 5 The Court thus recognized the activities
of the NAACP as involving "constitutionally guaranteed civil rights."' 6 The
Court emphasized that the NAACP had amply shown that its activities fell
within the constitutional protections, while the State "has failed to advance
any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing
from petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which
11. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55, (1960), rehearing denied, Oct.
12, 1960.
12. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 85 provides in part:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by
any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. . . . He [the lawyer] should avoid all relations which direct the per-
formance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization . . . to render
legal services in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested,
but this employment should not include the rendering of legal services to the
members of such an organization in respect to their individual affairs.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 47 provides that: "No lawyer shall permit his
professional services, or his name, to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the un-
authorized practice of law by any lay agency, personal or corporate."
13. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1968).
14. Id. at 429.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 442.
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it has imposed."'17 The Court then concluded that although the State has
a valid interest in regulating professional conduct, only if that interest is
compelling has the State the right to limit first amendment freedoms, "[flor
a State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct,
ignore constitutional rights."' 8
The decision was not without dissent. Mr. Justice Harlan emphasized
the following facts: the staff lawyers were selected by the NAACP and re-
ceived compensation therefrom; they had to agree to abide by NAACP
policies; directives to the lawyer had much to do with the form and sub-
stance of the litigation, and as to the type of plaintiffs to be sought; and the
lawyers were retained by obtaining signatures on blank forms from the pro-
spective litigants.19 "In short, as these [facts] and other materials on the
record show, the form of pleading, the type of relief to be requested, and
the proper timing of suits have to a considerable extent, if not entirely,
been determined by . . . [the NAACP's directives]."2 0 Mr. Justice Harlan
concluded that the NAACP's activities could be constitutionally regulated
by the State.
The legal profession received Button with relative calm, as it was felt
that the decision only extended protection to activities aimed at securing
political rights.2 ' The profession was aroused from complacency the very
next year, however, when the Court decided Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Virginia.22 Here, the Union maintained a Department of Legal
Counsel, with an attorney appointed for each of its sixteen regions. The
Brotherhood, which had been instrumental in obtaining passage of federal
laws to protect railroad employees,2 3 had established the Department to en-
sure that members injured or killed and their families would receive the
benefits to which they were entitled. Thus, when a worker was injured or
killed, a member of the Brotherhood would visit him or his widow, and
advise them of their legal rights, suggesting the counsel of that region as
being competant to handle the claim. The Virginia Supreme Court24 granted
an injunction against the Brotherhood, finding that such activities chan-
neled most, if not all, of these claims to attorneys chosen by the Union. The
Brotherhood insisted that such activities were constitutionally protected
17. Id. at 444.
18. Id. at 439.
19. Id. at 448-50.
20. Id. at 450.
21. Steiner, Bargained-For Group Legal Services: Aid for the Average Wage Earner?,
11 ARiz. L. REv. 617, 619 (1969).
22. 377 U.S. 1 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as BRT].
23. Acts in which the Brotherhood was instrumental in obtaining passage were the
Safety Appliance Act of 1893, and the Federal Employers Liability Act of 1908.
24. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 207 Va. 182, 149 S.E.2d 265
(1966).
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under the first and fourteenth amendment freedoms of speech, petition
and assembly. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Virginia
court and vacated the injunction holding, "The First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect the right of the members through their Brotherhood
to maintain and carry out their plan for advising workers who are injured
to obtain legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers. '2 5
'In arriving at its decision, the Court cited both Button and Gideon v.
Wainwright,2O asserting that "[t]he Constitution protects the associational
rights of the members of the union precisely as it does those of the
NAACP."27 Although recognizing Virginia's broad power to regulate the
profession within its borders, the Court emphasized that in its efforts at
regulation, constitutionally guaranteed rights must be observed.28 Justice
Clark, writing the dissent with Justice Harlan concurring, in a caustic
prologemenon, stated: "By its decision today the Court overthrows state
regulation of the legal profession and relegates the practice of law to the
level of a commercial enterprise."2 9 He saw a basic distinction between
Button and the case at hand; namely, that Button was circumscribed to
activities aimed at obtaining constitutionally protected civil rights, while
BRT involved personal injury litigation, which is "a procedure for the
settlement of damage claims."8 0 Activity such as this not being a form of
political expresion, it was subject to regulation by the State. Justice Clark
concluded: "The potential for evil in the union's system is enormous and
.. will bring disrepute to the legal profession."3 1
After BRT, it was felt that the path was cleared for recognition of
group legal services.32 That recognition came shortly thereafter, in United
Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Association.33 An action was
commenced by the Illinois State Bar Association seeking to enjoin the
UMW from what it considered the unauthorized practice of law. The
Union retained a counsel to whom it paid an annual salary; his role was
25. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Supreme Court here upheld the right of indigents to
counsel in criminal proceedings for non-capital as well as capital offenses.
27. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
28. Id. at 6. The Court further stated that the union members' right to advise one
another was an integral part of their constitutionally-guaxanteed right of mutual
assistance, which did not constitute an unauthorized practice of law, and which the State
could not prohibit. The Court then made mention of the British practice whereby unions
retain counsel to represent their members in personal lawsuits, "a practice similar to
that which we upheld in NAACP v. Button ... " Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
32. Schwartz, Foreward: Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rav.
280 (1965).
33. 389 U.S. 217 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as UMW].
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to represent any members who wished his service in presenting workmen's
compensation claims before the Illinois Industrial Commission. The at-
torney was not directed by the Union in any way in conducting his in-
vestigation or handling the claims. The Union merely provided members
with forms which they were to fill out and send to the attorney, stating
their claim. The attorney prepared the case from the file, made an estimate
of its value and presented it to the defendant coal company. When an agree-
ment was reached, the attorney would notify the client, and would advise
him whether or not to accept. If the client did not accept, a hearing was
held before the Illinois Industrial Commission. Normally, this would be the
first time the attorney and client came into direct contact, although the
Union member was aware that the attorney could be reached at certain
times and places. On these facts, the Illinois Supreme Court3 4 found that
the Union's activities constituted the unauthorized practice of law and
granted a permanent injunction, rejecting petitioner's claim that this vio-
lated its constitutionally guaranteed rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments. That court found that Button applied only in cases where
political rights were involved, and that BRT was applicable only in those
cases where lawyers were recommended to clients, but not to the actual
hiring of counsel by the group. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the Illinois court, and vacated the injunction, holding, "The freedom of
speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis
to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights."35
The Supreme Court, contending that Illinois' interpretation of Button
and BRT was too narrow, again emphasized the test as being one of balanc-
ing the State's interest in regulating the conduct of the profession against
the constitutional guarantees under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Before the State can restrict associational rights, the offending practice must
be serious enough to actually endanger the profession's standards. Mr.
Justice Harlan, alone dissenting, reiterated his argument in Button that
litigation is more than mere speech; it is conduct, and as such is subject to
reasonable regulation.3 Although he favored the balancing approach, he
was of the opinion "that the majority has weighed the competing interests
badly, according too much force to the claims of the Union and too little to
those of the public interest at stake."37 He felt the same objectives could be
obtained by alternative methods, such as Union recommendation of at-
34. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503
(1966).
35. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967).
36. Id. at 226.
37. Id. at 228.
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torneys considered competent to handle such cases, or through imposition
of dues on Union members to maintain a collective fund to reimburse them
if they became involved in litigation.3 8 He concluded by saying:
This decision, which again manifests the peculiar insensitivity to
the need for seeking an appropriate constitutional balance between
federal and state authority that in recent years has characterized so
many of the Court's decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment,
puts this Court more deeply than ever in the business of supervising
the practice of law in the various States. From my standpoint, what
is done today is unnecessary, undesirable, and constitutionally all
wrong. In the absence of demonstrated arbitrary or discriminatory
regulation, state courts and legislatures should be left to govern
their own Bars, free from interference by this Court.8 9
II. GRouP LEGAL SERVICES AND THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The impact of these three deisions has been recognized by the authors
of the new Code. In the Preface it is noted that: "Recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States have necessitated intensive studies of
certain Canons."40 The Code's treatment of group legal services, however,
is still rather restrictive. While asserting the right of every member of our
society to counsel when needed,41 and recognizing that the solution of legal
problems depends upon the recipient's recognition of their existence and
importance, and necessarily, upon his ability to obtain legal services, 42 there
is still a refusal to approve group service plans except as already specifically
determined by the Court. This unwillingness is manifest in Disciplinary
Rule 2-103, entitled Recommendation of Professional Employment, sub-
paragraph D-(5), which provides:
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization
that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to promote
the use of his services or those of his partners or associates. How-
ever, he may cooperate in a dignified manner with the legal services
activities of any of the following, provided that his independent
professional judgment is exercised in behalf of his client without
interference or control by any organization or other person:
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes,
or pays for legal services to its members or -beneficiaries, but only
in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretation at the time of the rendition of such services requires
the allowance of such legal service activities ... 43
38. Id. at 228-30.
39. Id. at 233-34 (emphasis added).
40. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at i.
41. Id., EC 1-1.
42. Id., EC 2-1.
43. Id., DR 2-103-D(5) (emphasis added).
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Thus, the obvious question presents itself; in light of the "controlling
constitutional interpretation" of Button, BRT and UMW, and the limita-
tions of DR 2-103-D(5), what types of group leg4 services are permissible?
To limit group legal services to those in defense of fundamental political
rights of the type recognized in Button is a quite narrow interpretation. In
contrast, the effect of BRT and UMW was to assert that "the enforcement
of any legal rights, even purely personal civil injury claims, could be
assisted by an organization."44 The possibility that this service could be
rendered only by means of referral services, as recognized by BRT, was ex-
panded in UMW to approval of "a plan under which an organization both
employed and paid for an advocate." 45 The Bar seems to indicate, however,
that only those forms clearly established are to be recognized, and the Code
imposes additional requirements to ensure that group legal service plans
will not receive ready expansion. The Code provides that the primary pur-
pose of the group must be other than the rendition of such services,40
although the offering of such services must be reasonably related to the
organization's primary purpose.47 There is to be no financial benefit in
rendering these services. 48 and the beneficiary must be the client, not the
group.49
The intent of such restrictions is obvious. The Bar will recognize plans
such as those of the NAACP, Brotherhood, or Mine Workers, since they
satisfy all these requirements. However, any attempt to establish groups for
the sole purpose of providing legal services is forbidden, as is the rendition
of any legal services if the primary purpose of the organization cannot be
reasonably related to the offering of such services. Absent from the Code
is a provision allowing for a balancing of public interests, for there are
really two interests at stake: the public interest in a profession of high
ethical standing, and the public interest in adequate legal services for all
in need. These interests are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but dispro-
portionate weight on one, as in the Code, will make attainment of the other
quite difficult. The Code desires only that high professional standards be
maintained. Such a restrictive view has been justified on the grounds that it
prevents needless litigation, fraudulent claims, and undesirable competition
between attorneys which could lead to deprofessionalization6 0
The primary responsibility of the Bar, however, is to make legal services
available to all who need them.5 ' As one author comments:
44. Steiner, supra note 21, at 619.
45. Id.
46. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103-D(5)-(a).
47. Id., DR 2-103-D(5)-(b).
48. Id., DR 2-103-D(5)-(c).
49. Id., DR 2-103-D(5)-(d).
50. See Schwartz, supra note 82, at 287.
51. See Cheatham, supra note 4, at 985.
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[t~he standards of lawyers are not ends in themselves, nor are they
negative in their object. They are affirmative in their purpose and
are means to the end of better performance of the lawyers' roles.
They are no more immutable than any other laws or standards.
If under changed conditions they come to block the purpose they
are intended to serve, they should be modified or rejected .... 52
This may very well happen to the new Code, as it did to the old Canons.
The Supreme Court has provided the test-only if a state can show a sub.
stantive evil endangering the profession's standards will it be permitted to
restrict first and fourteenth amendment rights and the constitutionally
guaranteed organizational freedom of members of the community to unite
in order to secure legal services. Regarding any specific plan of group legal
services, "the test of the organization's acceptability should be the benefit
to the public in terms of price, effectiveness, and competence of the legal
service. ' 53 Undoubtedly, if the need for legal services remains unfulfilled,
experimentation in new means to provide such services is inevitable. If
there is any deviation from the restrictions imposed by the Code, the Bar
has made it clear that it will challenge such extensions to force the ques-
tion of whether any new group service plan will be allowable, since the Code
states that these requirements are to have effect unless prohibited by the
courts. 54 The Court in all three cases speaks of the activities conducted as
involving a fundamental right of association to obtain legal services. It
seems that if there is such a right, then its exercise should not be unduly
restricted by the stringently narrow confines of the Code.
The next logical step in the development of group plans might be the
establishment of organizations with the sole purpose of obtaining legal
services for their members. Such a plan would directly contravene the Code
provisions, and would therefore be an unauthorized practice of law. Under
the test developed by the Court, any such arrangement would have to ex-
hibit substantial evils endangering professional standards to be enjoined.
With the burden of proof resting on the state, it may not be easy to prove
the actual harm demanded by the Court. Absent such proof, and in light of
the Court's stand in the past, extension of the Court's imprimatur to recog-
nize such groups is likely. If such arrangements are included under the
protective aegis of the first and fourteenth amendments, then the Code
may abridge fundamental rights of association.
This is not to say that all of the Code's prohibitions are undesirable.
"[T]he standards that help to insure dependable service ... must be main-
tained."5 5 Certainly the requirement that the organization not influence the
52. Id. at 979.
53. Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YAr.E L.J. 966, 982
(1967).
54. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspONSimILrrY DR 2-103-D(5).
55. Cheatham, supra note 4, at 985.
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lawyer-client relationship is important since this could very well lead to
conflicts of interest between the needs of the client and those of the group.
However, "[t]he mere possibility that the union-employer [or any other
organization] may exert pressure on the attorney-employee and thereby in-
duce the latter to divide his loyalties is not sufficient reason to invalidate a
plan of group legal services that is clearly in the public interest."G0 It is
very likely that the interests of the group and its individual members will
often coincide. If this is the case, then the fear of conflict of interest is
largely unwarranted. It has been noted that many existing plans, including
those of the NAACP and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, do exhibit
a strict attorney-client relationship, thus avoiding possibilities of conflicting
interests 57 In the event that a conflict does arise, the Bar and the courts
are available to supervise, for "[u]nder a plan of group legal services ... the
attorney ... is as subject to control and discipline by the courts as any other
attorney would be."58
Litigation may very well increase with greater use of these plans. The
Bar has opposed the proliferation of lawsuits, but unquestionably a plaintiff
with a meritorious claim deserves his day in court, regardless of the fact that
our judicial apparatus is presently overloaded. The difficulty with the Bar's
ethical rules is that they do not necessarily eliminate unmeritorious claims,
but rather tend to eliminate unknowing claimants5 9 In addition, there is
potentially a preventive advantage in an arrangement whereby a group
affords its members attorneys' services. If a person can consult readily with
an attorney, as such plans provide, he may be spared the necessity of litiga-
tion at some later date. Litigation is often the costly result of a person's
ignorance or mistakes when faced with a situation with possible legal com-
plications. Legal advice in the early stages may make protracted and expen-
sive court action to rectify such mistakes unnecessary. This would be an
attractive feature of group legal services which could help eventually to re-
duce the workload of the courts.
A fear has been expressed as to possible adverse effects group legal
services may have on the composition of the profession. The feeling is that
it is the large firm which will benefit from group legal services since, being
the most efficient, it could best handle the volume, and thus would attract
the most business.60 Others feel that due to the nature of the profession,
with the greater majority of lawyers practicing in small firms, there is a
danger that "if large blocks of the public had their problems channeled to
56. Cady, The Future of Group Legal Services, 55 A.B.AJ. 420, 421 (1969).
57. See Zimroth, supra note 53, at 974.
58. Cady, supra note 56, at 423.
59. See Zimroth, supra note 53, at 979.
60. Greenawalt, Group Legal Services - Why, and How, 41 N.Y.S.B.J. 300, 806
(1969).
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group service lawyers, the competitive consequences might be devastating." 61
To the contrary, there is an equally cogent argument that "this [group legal
services] is not going to be terribly profitable business because there are
going to be reduced fees and hourly charges involved, and ... therefore, we
may find that this actually helps the smaller firms and the smaller practi-
tioners."6 2 If there are no fortunes to be made in group legal services, then
the argument that they will lead to commercialization of the profession
seems groundless. Indeed, a large demand for services which at present are
not being supplied would lead one to assume that the profession as a whole
will benefit by group legal service plans.
A further advantage of group legal services is the potential for legal
education of the community which could lead to an increased awareness of
legal problems by the public at large. "There is no guarantee that in time
the members of the public will, by self-education, come to understand that
their problems can best be handled by a lawyer. Mechanisms such as group
legal services are one way of bringing these important facts home to them." 6s
The disturbing aspect of the Bar's position is that its objection to
group legal services will certainly delay their development; the advantages
of such services might thereby be lost while the problems they are designed
to alleviate will continue unabated. One commentator succinctly expresses
the fundamental problem when he states: "a group of people organize to
provide cheaper or more efficient legal service for themselves or for others;
no one challenges the utility of the organization, only its legality; the
challenge may be successful because the organization has committed or will
commit an ethical sin."6 4 The Bar's worthy intentions seem, therefore, mis-
directed. In BRT, for example, the client determined the course of the
litigation. "The only kind of control exerted by the Brotherhood seemed
to benefit its members since it provided cheaper, more efficient service. Yet
the practice was outlawed, because 'control' was bad.'"'  Reliance on many
traditional standards that are irrelevant to today's situations will mean that
effective remedies will be undeservedly stymied.
Finally, even if the non-indigent realizes, as in the past, that he has a
legal problem, he is often faced with the difficult task of selecting an at-
torney competent to handle his particular problem. For the most part, he is
limited to "contacting a non-lawyer relative or friend, selecting a name from
61. Stolz, Insurance for Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of Feasibility, 35 U.
Cm. L. REv. 417, 422 (1968).
62. Greenawalt, supra note 60, at 306.
63. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 287. Labor unions could be extremely effective
here, by establishing educational programs for their members. This would certainly be
one way of reaching a large segment of the population.
64. Zimroth, supra note 53, at 968 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 975.
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the Yellow Pages, walking through the district where lawyers tend to con-
gregate or visiting one whose office is nearby, or calling lawyer reference
services in communities where they exist." 66 It is obvious that only in the
last case has the potential client been given any assistance; in the other
instances he has a "hit-and-miss" chance of selecting an able attorney.
"Group legal service plans tend to reduce the element of chance with re-
spect to the competence of the attorney retained by the client." 7 There-
fore, group services can aid in reducing the fears of the client.
Education of the public to legal problems, cheaper and more efficient
services, some guarantee of counsel's competence-all these have been cited
as advantages of group legal services. They could go far toward solving the
problem of inadequate legal services. Whether or not they are the only, or
best means, remains to be seen.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO GROUP LEGAL SERvICES
One attempt at fulfilling the public's need for adequate rendition of
legal services which has had the approval and active support of the Bar is
lawyer referral service.
The legal profession has developed lawyer referral systems de-
signed to aid individuals who are able to pay fees but need assist-
ance in locating lawyers competent to handle their particular
problems. Use of a lawyer referral system enables a layman to avoid
an uninformed selection of a lawyer because such a system makes
possible the employment of competent lawyers who have indicated
an interest in the subject matter involved. Lawyers should support
the principle of lawyer referral systems .... s
It should be noted that the benefits attributed to group legal services are
the very ones thought so important in relation to lawyer referral services.
The basic premises upon which lawyer referral is founded are that both the
public and the profession benefit when legal problems are handled by those
trained in the law, and that the lawyer's monopoly in providing such
-services imposes a duty to make these services readily available at prices
:affordable by all.69
The actual operation of such a system is relatively simple. The service
functions through a panel of lawyers, and most services make at least some
66. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 288.
67. Id. at 290.
68. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY EC 2-15.
69. Christensen, Lawyer Referral Service: An Alternative to Lay-Group Legal Serv-
ices?, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 341, 342 (1965).
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attempt to vouch for the competence of their participating practitioners.7 °
When a prospective client calls at the service office, an attorney will discuss
his problem with him, and make an evaluation of the individual's situation.
He will then arrange for an interview between the client and an attorney
affiliated with the service. After the initial meeting with the attorney at the
service office, the client and the designated lawyer are free to take any action
they decide upon' 1 Thus, the referral system is basically designed to func-
tion as a "middleman" to bring attorney and client together.
Some lawyers are of the opinion that "[t]he lawyer referral plan is an
ideal approach to the problem because it is directed toward the very seg-
ment of the public that must be reached-those able to pay reasonable fees
but reluctant to take their legal problems to lawyers." 72 Essential to the
success of any referral service is the active support of the local Bar, and
"continuous and effective publicity."73 Unfortunately, it has been noted
that the plan has not been adopted by many local Bars, and of those which
have established such services, there are too few that give it active sup-
port.74 The importance of publicity is obvious. The very existence of
lawyer referral is a testimonial to the ignorance of the public about legal
problems and services. If the public were fully aware of these, what need
would there be in having lawyer referral? On the other hand, if the public
is unaware of the existence of a service such as lawyer referral, they are in
no better position than if the concept had never arisen and been put into
effect. Unquestionably, to allow individual lawyers to publicize would be
undesirable and would lower the profession's esteem. However, if individual
attorneys must be forbidden to publicize, then it is incumbent that the Bar
assure adequate information as to the existence of lawyer referral. In light
of the almost total reliance of the Bar on lawyer referral, this obligation
assumes even greater importance.
A second alternative to lay group legal services which has been proposed
is that of legal insurance. Professor Stolz, who has developed at least a
70. Christensen states that the lawyers who serve'on the panel usually designate
the "kinds of cases they will or will not accept from the referral services." Most lawyer
referral services operate by allowing designation of areas for their participating attorneys,
although some "have established special panels of lawyers to handle cases in specific
fields of law." A few even "make some attempt to limit membership on special panels
to lawyers who are actually qualified in those fields of law." Id. at 347-48.
71. iMadden & Christensen, Lawyer Referral Service: A Sensible Approach to a
Difficult Problem, 49 A.B.AJ. 965, 966 (1963).
72. Id. (emphasis added). The client is charged an initial fee, usually five dollars
for the first half-hour he spends with the designated attorney. If further consultation is
necessary, the attorney and client arrange between themselves for additional financing.
73. Id.
74. Christensen is of the opinion that presently, lawyer referral is far too limited
in scope. "The efficacy of the lawyer referral service as an alternative to lay-group legal
services depends upon the extent to which these . . . deficiencies can be remedied."
Christensen, supra note 69, at 344.
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rudimentary plan, is of the opinion that "[a] legal insurance scheme could
be designed with the chief goal of providing a convenient way to budget
relatively modest, frequently encountered legal costs. ' 76 Legal insurance
itself is not a novel idea. The public has long had access to automobile and
homeowner's liability insurance, and for most purposes, the coverage is ade-
quate.1 6 However, the Stolz proposal would seek to extend the use of in-
surance to cover a greater variety of circumstances where liability may be
imposed by law.
The Stolz plan has three major characteristics. First, there is the basic
benefit. This is the price a client would have to pay for one hour's con-
sultation per year with an attorney. Under the plan there would be no
charge for the initial visit.77 The advantages supposedly which would derive
from the basic benefit are rather extensive. Stolz believes that such a pro-
vision would be adequate to fully cover most people to the extent that they
need legal assistance, would encourage use of lawyers when there is a ques-
tion as to the existence of a legal problem since there would be no initial
cost, would solve most landlord-tenant, will-drafting, real estate and con-
sumer problems, and finally, would prevent needless litigation. 78 The second
major characteristic is that of exceptions to coverage, and there are many.
There should be no coverage where insurance is already available,70 where
claims are currently handled on a contingent fee basis,80 in matters involv-
ing probate, divorce, wage claims, and enforcement of support cases, 81 and
75. Stolz, supra note 61, at 425.
76. Id. at 436. Stolz cautions not to draw too extensive an analogy to health insur-
ance, for two reasons. First, it is likely that all persons will at some time or another need
the services of a doctor, whereas, there is no substantial likelihood that an attorney's
services will ever be required. Second, the major cost of health insurance reflects in-
stitutional rather than professional charges, i.e., the cost of hospital rooms, medicine,
etc. The cost of legal services, on the other hand, is almost completely a reflection of
the price of professional services. Id. at 423.
77. Id. at 455. This coverage, however, would not apply for consultation regarding
tax returns.
78. Id. at 455-56.
79. Automobile and homeowner's insurance come under this exclusion, with the
exception that if the claim exceeds the limits of the policy, or if the insured is subject
to counterclaims, or if both parties are insured by the same insurer, there should be
coverage. Id. at 456-57.
80. Excluded under this provision would be all claims for personal injury, work-
men's compensation, or condemnation cases. Id. at 457-58.
81. Coverage in these areas would be limited to the basic benefit, but only in a
very restricted sense. Stolz feels that most probate matters can be handled sufficiently
within the time alloted under the basic benefit, and thus should not be given any
expanded coverage. As for the other three areas, since there are public agencies estab-
lished to handle these situations, the insured would be entitled only to counsel for the
purpose of advising the client as to what agency can properly handle his problems. Id.
at 457-59.
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in criminal cases.82 The third major characteristic is the provision of addi-
tional benefits beyond the basic benefit. This would be allowed by estab-
lishing a schedule providing additional coverage under certain circum-
stances. Thus, if the insured found himself a defendant in a civil suit he
would be entitled to a minimum of an extra hour of consultation and a
maximum of one day in court.83 If there is extended litigation, Stolz pro-
vides a "major trial benefit" which would entitle the insured to a maxi-
mum of ten days in court if he were a plaintiff, or some extent of co-insur-
ance if he were a defendant.8 4
On the advantages of such a plan, Professor Stolz states that "a legal
insurance plan, unlike group legal services, could be organized to permit
the client-insured to select his own lawyer, who would be compensated by
benefits from the insurance p9licy."8 5 In addition, such a program would
not involve the difficulties of administration encountered in group legal
services, or the danger that a member of such a group will not receive ade-
quate representation from the service's attorney.8 He does point to the
fact, however, that group legal services have the advantages of economies
of scale and designation of lawyers.8 7 As long as free choice of lawyer is
maintained, no insurance plan would be able to compete financially with
group legal services. He calls, therefore, for recognition of legal specialties,
with the requirement that lawyers would be selected according to the areas
in which they are deemed competent. "In this way, both economies of scale
and client free choice could be achieved."88 Finally, he feels that by pre-
paying the cost of legal services through the insurance plan people would
not be as fearful of consulting a lawyer.8 9
There are certain difficulties which will be encountered in trying to
devise and implement a plan of legal insurance. First, there is the problem
of defining who is the recipient of such services. This is clearly defined in
the case of medical insurance since the recipient is obviously the patient.
The insured under a legal insurance policy need not be the beneficiary,
and this leads also to the problem of deciding who can and who cannot be
a beneficiary of such a policy. Secondly, the need for such insurance is
unevenly distributed. As one's property holdings increase, the likelihood
82. Criminal liability would be excluded, because there are public agencies, such
as the public defender, to handle these cases. Id. at 459-60.
83. Id. at 460. The extra consultation would also be available to the insured in
the following situations: if he found himself to be a respondent in an administrative
hearing, if he were arrested, or if he had his tax return audited.
84. Id. at 461.
85. Id. at 421-22.
86. Id. at 474-75.
87. Id. at 472.
88. Id. at 451.
89. Id. at 422.
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that a person will become involved in litigation becomes greater. Thus, the
poorer man may well end up paying a disproportionate share for the
richer's legal claims and liabilities. Thirdly, the very concept of legal insur-
ance is not easily defined. Necessarily, it would have to be determined what
situations will or will not be covered and how much flexibility is to be
allowed. Thus, problems in determining the benefit may arise.00 All these
difficulties would have to be overcome before implementation of any such
program.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is probably no one plan that would completely fulfill the
presently unsatisfied need for legal services. The different approaches, how-
ever, are all aimed at the same problem-filling the gap between the need
for and the ,actual provision of adequate legal services for the non-indigent.
Therefore, the plans could complement one another, and thereby serve
the needs of the greatest number of individuals. Our priorities, however, will
determine initially which proposal will be employed. If one feels, for ex-
ample, that the need for legal awareness and assurance of competency of
counsel outweighs the desire to maintain a strict attorney-client relation-
ship, one would tend to favor group legal service proposals. If the primary
concern is with maintaining the direct contact between lawyer and client
one might lean towards referral services or legal insurance. Each of these
plans has beneficial characteristics which go towards eliminating at least
part of the problem.
An overall program could be provided utilizing each of the plans to
some extent. By implementing group legal services in such organizations as
unions, automobile clubs, or other groups where the members share some
common interest, a basis would be formed for providing legal services of
all natures to the members. For those individuals who are not affiliated with
any such group, an attempt could be made to service their needs by use of
referral services or legal insurance. For those who are willing and able to
pay, insurance could be best used to fulfill their needs. However, since the
coverage of such a policy, at least in Stolz's proposal, is limited to some
extent, lawyer referral would be available to serve those not covered by
legal insurance because of inability to sustain the cost. A cooperative plan
could be designed to prevent overlapping of legal services by providing
that the recipient who belongs to an organization which conducts a legal
service program would not be eligible for legal insurance or for use of
referral systems. Those individuals who can afford to pay for legal insur-
ance would be eligible for only this type of assistance. It would be necessary
to establish the income level below which the cost of legal insurance is
90. Id. at 425.
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prohibitive; once determined, any person whose income falls below this
minimum would be a likely recipient of referral services. 91
The benefits of such a scheme could be quite extensive. The recipients
of any particular type of service could be much more easily identified. Once
identified, the assessing of the individual needs of the clients and the pro-
vision of greater service of those needs would be greatly simplified. The
scheme would also lend itself much more readily to policing activities in
order to guard against abuses. Finally, if such a system were established, it
would virtually eliminate the public's ignorance of the law and its processes.
On the other hand, the system would be undesirable in that it would
limit the client's free choice of services which is present under existing
arrangements. Also, it is discriminatory in the sense that the eligibility of
an individual for any specific type of legal service is determined by factors
contingent to his actual need, for example, whether the individual belongs
to some organization which provides legal services, or whether his income
is above or below a certain level. However, an extensive public relations
program designed to educate the public as to the problems of insufficiency
of legal services, and as to what each plan is designed to achieve, could
eventually persuade the recipients to support such a comprehensive plan.
In light of the fact that the legal profession exists primarily to serve the
public, it seems that fulfillment of the public need should be the legal pro-
fession's primary objective.
Whether or not such a comprehensive plan would ever meet with the
approval of the courts, the Bar, or the public at this time remains con-
jectural. One thing is certain-our present attempts to solve the problem of
providing legal services have been inadequate. Much of the blame for this
rests with the profession itself. The Code, like its predecessor, emphasizes
lawyer referral services almost to the total exclusion of any other approach.
It has required the force of judicial decisions to make the Bar relax its
prohibitive rules. If the Bar is going to continue to stress lawyer referral,
then it has an obligation to insure that such a plan will do all that is
needed.
The development of group legal services clearly reflects the profession's
failure to forge lawyer referral into an effective tool. Therefore, it should
not be surprising if the non-legal community continues to fend for itself,
with greater provision for and further refinement of group legal services.
The Bar's concern with maintaining the ethical standards of the profession
is justifiable and worthy. Yet, the legal community must also fulfill its com-
91. The economic viability of group legal services is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, this aspect presents some important questions which must be answered;
for example, questions such as whether a group legal services plan would be economically
attractive to lawyers and the public, and what the cost to each would be, need to be
extensively studied.
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mittment of service. The way to insure both is not by arbitrary discrimi-
nation against any specific plan. Rather, the Bar should adopt an attitude
of "watchfulness" whereby it would not automatically adjudge group legal
plans as unauthorized practice of law, but would allow their existence until
proven harmful. This, in effect, would be giving the test developed by the
Supreme Court official recognition in the Code. More importantly, it would
give the Bar a flexibility now unfortunately lacking. If the Bar really
wishes to be an effective guardian of ethical standards, it should work closely
in the development of such plans. It would be wise for the Bar to remember
that these plans have a powerful ally in the Supreme Court.
The present Code is altruistic in its formulation of the problem. How-
ever, the worthy intentions evidenced in the ethical considerations are
not borne out by the provisions of the disciplinary rules. In restricting
group legal service plans, the Bar must have a more substantial justification
for such an attitude than its contention that there is potential abuse inherent
in such plans. Even if there was general agreement on this premise, there
must still be provision for an adequate substitute by the profession. Dis-
ciplinary Rule 2-103-D, therefore, is an unrealistic and desirable rule.
The Bar's position should be carefully re-evaluated.
NORMAN A. LEBLANC, JR.
NEW YORK ABORTION REFORM AND CONFLICTING MUNICIPAL
REGULATIONS: A QUESTION OF HOME RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Abortion and its array of associated problems have been the focus of
intense controversy for at least the last decade. During the past three years,
certain states have passed "liberalized" abortion statutes,' amending laws
which have been in existence since before the Civil War. The New York
State Abortion Law of 1828 served as the original model for other state
abortion statutes, 2 and the law remained virtually unchanged until this
year. The constant legislative debate on abortion reform in New York has
been so unpredictable that the 1969 legislature rejected, by nine votes, an
abortion reform bill which would be considered restrictive as compared to
I. "Liberalization" of the abortion laws during the period of 1967-69, meant that
the states allowed abortions only if the woman would be in danger of death if the fetus
was not terminated. Colorado, North Carolina, and California enacted such statutes in
1967; Georgia and Maryland in 1968; and Arkansas, Kansas, Delaware, Oregon and New
Mexico followed in 1969. In 1970, Hawaii, Alaska, and New York passed laws which
abolished practically all restrictions on abortions. D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION LAW, CnoicE
AND MORAITY 140 (1970).
2. See Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
Foetus 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 445 (1968).
